Too Many Chefs in the Climate Change Kitchen

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By Maeve Hogel

Climate-exchange.org's analysis of the utility of climate scenarios and the criticisms of both top-down and bottom-up methods.
Climate-exchange.org’s analysis of the utility of climate scenarios and the criticisms of both top-down and bottom-up methods.

With the glaciers continuing to melt, the sea levels continuing to rise and extreme weather events getting more extreme, the pressure is on to make something big happen in climate change negotiations. However, every country has a different point of view on what that something big should be. The hopes of the low lying islands would be drastically different than the hopes of a developed country such as the United States. With the widely different views and goals of the many different Parties involved, a “top-down” approach on mitigation is not the best option, but when combined with a “bottom-up” approach to create a multi-track one, there may be hope for pleasing everyone while doing what is best for the planet.

A “top-down” approach to climate change negotiation starts at the highest level and works its way down. In the international regime of the UNFCCC, the Parties come together to decide on a commitment and in theory will be held responsible to uphold this commitment. In contrast, in a “bottoms-up” approach, commitment and action start at the local level and work up to the international level. Daniel Bodansky in The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement argues that both are relatively equal effectiveness because “facilitative bottom-up approaches score well in terms of participation and implementation, but low in terms of stringency; top-down contractual approaches the reverse” (Bodansky, 2). Basically, the strengths of one are the weakness of the other and vice versa. However, not everyone agrees that the two approaches yield equally effective, or not effective, results. Steve Rayer in How to Eat an Elephant: a Bottom-up Approach to Climate Change Policy (Abridged Version here) states that although top-down approaches are useful for setting goals and standards that all Parties should meet, he doesn’t believe in “setting grandiose emissions targets without any plausible technological pathway for achieving them” (Rayer, 620). Rayer believes that UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol represent the failures of top-down approaches because they rely too heavily on politicians who don’t necessarily prioritize climate change (Rayer, 616).

While I don’t necessarily agree that top-down and bottoms-up approaches result in equal effectiveness, I also don’t believe that the UNFCCC or the Kyoto protocol is a failure. As the age-old idiom goes “there are too many chefs in the kitchen” when it comes to climate change negotiations. However, that doesn’t mean you put each chef in his own kitchen. In a top-down approach there are too many Parties who want too many different things to find an effective solution that makes everyone happy. However, in a bottom-up approach, there is no one to enforce that changes are being made and that everyone is working together. Climate change is a global issue so it needs to be dealt with in some respect in a global arena. At the same time, local governments and groups have a better understanding on what is practical and possible in their culture and community. A multi-track approach that can allow policies to start at the local level, but still holds people responsible at the international level is the best way to continue climate change negotiations in the future.

 

Bodansky, Daniel. “The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement.” December 2012.

Rayer, Steve. “How To Eat An Elephant: A Bottom-Up Approach To Climate Policy.” Climate Policy (Earthscan) 10.6 (2010): 615-621. Environment Complete. Web. 7 Oct. 2014.

A Mixed-Tack Paris Agreement Is the Way to Go

Cartoon by Matt Bors
Cartoon by Matt Bors

 

The COP 20 is hoped to make progress for the 2015 COP, the deadline COP the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) set for finishing negotiations for a new, more aggressive agreement between UNFCCC nations to combat climate change. As this deadline comes closer and closer, academics, delegates, NGOs and country leaders are scrambling to find the best type of new solution. Daniel Bodansky, of Arizona State University, explains that the three variables in international climate agreements, stringency, participation, and compliance, are all present in each negotiation, in various degrees depending on the nature of the agreement (Bodansky 2). For example, a top-down approach like that of the Kyoto Protocol in which international laws enforce internationally agreed-upon actions, leads to a greater degree of stringency and an uncertain outcome in terms of the participation and compliance variables. The level of presence for these two variables depends on whether the mutually-assured-compliance feature of top-down approaches is enough to convince states to take part and participate in the treaty (Bodansky 2). Conversely, the bottom-up approach like that of the Cancun Agreements where nations come up with their own commitments for international agreements, tend to have higher participation and commitment but low stringency (Bodansky 2). With advantages and disadvantages to both the bottom-up and top-down approaches, a mixed-track approach is the most promising structure for a 2015 agreement providing the increased ambition needed to act against climate change.

Not all scholars would agree that a mixed-track approach is the answer. David Shorr, an analyst of multilateral affairs, argues that the best way to go for the COP21 agreement is a top-down structure. He writes in his “Think Again: Climate Treaties”, “there is no substitute for high-level diplomacy in getting everyone to do their utmost and in keeping track of their efforts” (Shorr). Shorr acknowledges that there has been increased, and important, participation at the “bottom”, but when push comes to shove, a diplomatic treaty is a necessity in climate negotiations, quoting their stringency strengths through “keeping track of [countries’] efforts”. On the other side of the debate, Michael C. McCracken, the Chief Scientist for Climate Change Programs with the Climate Institute in Washington, D.C. argues that an international diplomatic agreement will not cut, as it has not for the past two decades. In his article “The Time to Act is Now”, McCracken argues that international agreements fail to inspire ambitious enough goals as signatories do not want to face punishments for goals they cannot keep (McCracken 15). Both McCracken and Shorr are correct in their own ways, but neither of their solutions will do enough on their own.

The multi-track approach Bodansky suggests, includes a combination of the strong points of both top-down and bottom-approaches, allowing in theory for the “best of both worlds”. He suggests offering various tracks of an agreement, allowing for nations to choose which tracks best suits their abilities, going off of the bottom-up approach. For example, one country might find it easiest to reduce greenhouse emissions as it is in desperate need of new infrastructure while another country may find it easier to develop and distribute new technologies aimed at a greener world (Bodanksy 9-10). The top-down aspect of this approach consists of a “core agreement” where economic-wide commitments are set out and a system for comparing different tracks’ efforts is established. Thus, an overall high level of stringency is achieved through a top-down core agreement alongside high levels of participation and compliance through bottom-up multi-track options. This structure offers the most promise looking forward to a 2015 agreement as it offers success in all three variables of success-measurement. Furthermore, those countries like the United States, who are not parties of the top-down Kyoto Protocol and those countries not parties to the Cancun Agreements are more likely to find a happy medium in a mixed-track agreement.

Works Cited

Bodansky, D., 2012. The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions.

MacCracken, M., 2014, “The time to act is now,” pp 13-19, G7 Summit 2014

Schorr, D., 2014, “Think Again: Climate Treaties” Foreign Policy: The Magazine. 17 March 2014. Web. 6 October 2014.

New England Governors and the Eastern Canadian Premiers

flags by bonnie

The New England Governors and the Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG-ECP) (Bulkely 59) has been holding annual conferences encouraging cooperation in reducing greenhouse gases since 1997, with the exception of four skipped years. (New England Govenors…Annual Conference) In 2000, the group created an action plan, the New England Governors and the Eastern Canadian Premiers Action Plan, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at least 10% below 1990 levels by 2020, and a 75-85% reduction of 2001 levels as a long term goal; the Action Plan was enforced on August 28, 2001. (New England Governors…Action Plan) The group involves the interests of six New England states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and five provinces from Canada (New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec). (New England Govenors…Annual Conference) The conferences are held in place regarding five major themes; “developing networks and relationships, taking collective action, engaging in regional projects and endorsing projects by others, undertaking research, increasing public awareness and shared interests” (New England Govenors…Annual Conference).

The NEG-ECP adopted the Climate Change Action Plan in 2001, the Mercury Action Plan in 1998, the Acid Rain Action Plan in 1998, and the Transportation Air Quality Action Plan in 2008 and through implementation of these plans, it has achieved reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. They also have implemented two regional agreements; the Mystic Covenant, a pledge to strengthen and promote trade relations, and the International Emergency Management Assistance Memorandum of Understanding. Alongside all of these accomplishments, NEG-ECP also has sponsored international forums on energy and the environment, published energy inventories, established agreements for international assistance in Emergency Management and Preparedness, and examined issues associated with changing demographics and its effect on the economy. (New England Governors… Annual Conference)

The states and provinces of this network are truly affective in reaching its goals and objectives as clearly stated above. “The NEG/ECP Conference has successfully undertaken initiatives in the areas of trade, energy, economic development, environment, oceans, forestry, agriculture, fisheries, transportation, information technology and tourism” (New England Governors…Action Plan).

 

Works Cited

Bulkeley, Harriet, and Peter Newell. “Chapter 3 Between Global And Local; Governing Climate Change Transnationally.” Governing Climate Change. London: Routledge, 2010. N. pag. Print.

“New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers Climate Change Action Plan 2001.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 28 Apr. 2014. Web. 01 Oct. 2014.

“New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers’ Annual Conference (NEG/ECP).” New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers’ (NEG/ECP) Annual Conference. Council of Atlantic Premiers, 2011. Web. 01 Oct. 2014. Web design by: immediacy

 

Ditch the 2°C limit? A costly detour

David Victor and Charles Kennel write in a recent commentary published by Nature “Politically and scientifically, the 2 °C goal is wrong-headed.” Their commentary has prompted a number of responses – see article in The Guardian by Adam Vaughan and rebuttals by Gavin Schmidt, Bill Hare and others, and Joe Romm.

Victor and Kennel argue that the 2 °C limit suffers from two political problems. First, they assert, keeping below 2 °C is unachievable without “heroic assumptions” about immediate global cooperation and widespread availability of technologies that have not been demonstrated at scale. Second, the 2 °C threshold does not translate into a specific and certain quantity of emissions, and therefore “does not tell particular governments and people what to do.”

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Scientifically, the basis for the 2 °C limit, according to Victor and Kennel, is tenuous, in part because changes in average global surface temperature does not track in lock step with climate forcing and climate risks on short time scales. They take the position that a single index of climate change risk is not possible given the complexities of how changes in carbon dioxide concentrations alter climate and other earth systems, and the consequent risks to ecological systems and humans. They advocate for development of a set of indicators, or “planetary vital signs,” to be used by policy makers and the UNFCCC to gauge climate stresses and possible impacts that are “better rooted in the scientific understanding of climate drivers and risks.”

Gavin Schmidt, director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, wrote an excellent rejoinder in Realclimate. He also posted a comment to an article in The Guardian about the Victor-Kennel commentary that nicely matches my take: “If you are driving in completely the wrong direction, arguing about where you’ll park if you arrive isn’t your highest priority.” I have significant doubts about the viability of reaching a comprehensive, top-down, legally binding agreement at COP21 in Paris. But urging parties to the UNFCCC to revisit the hard-won agreement to try to limit warming to < 2 °C, and consider replacing it with targets for an array of planetary vital signs, is an invitation to inaction that would have dangerous repercussions.

Do read Gavin Schmidt’s more detailed assessment of why the 2 °C limit should not be ditched. He makes a good case for the scientific validity for using average global temperature as a reasonable indicator of climate risk, and counters the assertion that the 2 °C limit is technically or economically unachievable.

WANTED: Adaption at Home and Abroad… NOW

[youtube_sc url=”https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNcUC1xUB5c”]

A basic principle of the UNFCCC agreement is CBDR, or Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. This stems from the idea that based on historical emissions, developing countries should not have their development taxed because of harm to the environment caused by already developed countries’ development 100 years ago. Because of this, developed countries are held responsible for funding any climate change efforts developing countries decide to embark on. Furthermore, developed countries are to share information and technology to help developing countries develop in a “greener” way than developed countries had in the past.

My question is, how can we do this if we still haven’t gotten the hang of smart development in our own country? I’m not suggesting the U.S. should help itself before it helps others, but instead should be taking a bilateral approach to both change domestic ways and provide support internationally for cleaner development.

Yesterday, the story “With Dry Taps and Toilets, California Drought Turns Desperate” made the front page of the NYTimes. Households in California, and especially those in Tulare County, a rural county with especially impoverished residents and barely any water. With three years of drought and still going strong, the California drought, although as a single event it cannot be attributed to climate change, calls for more caution when dealing with the climate. Even in one of the richest country in the world, the U.S. still doesn’t seem to be able to come up with even effective adaptation plans, never mind mitigation. One family the article focuses on hasn’t had running water for more than five months. How is the U.S. caring for these Californians? They aren’t. When families call the state and local governments for advice, they are told there are no public agencies set up to help them. Water is provided through bottled water from residents’ pockets and local charities. Even the counting of households without water is spotty, with an estimate of 700 households, overlooking households in rural areas with dried-up wells. One volunteer is quoted describing the drought as “it’s a slow-moving disaster that nobody knows how to handle” (Medina 18).

The U.S. is obviously having trouble preparing for and dealing with the “slow-moving” crises brought on by climate change, so how can it be expected to help others? The solution is not, as I said before, to focus on itself first before it helps others. There is no time to wait; climate change does not wait for domestic pilots, it comes when it wants, where it wants, and countries must be as ready as best they can. This means focusing on security threats from more than just other states but from the earth itself. The U.S. needs to take the terrible lessons it’s learning in California to realize that a much more though-out, cross-sector, and multi-level approach must be employed in adapting to climate change domestically and globally.

Medina, Jennifer. 2014. “With Dry Taps and Toilets, California Drought Turns Desperate.” The New York Times, October 3, p. 1, A18.

Start Small Then Go Big: Clinton Climate Initiative

GHG Emissions for C Cities

Chapter 3 of “Governing Climate Change” starts out with the statement “…climate change is an issue of concern not only on international and national agenda, but also for an array of transnational networks.”[1] So many transnational networks are being created with the purpose of addressing climate change. One of these many transnational networks is the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI). Former President Bill Clinton launched this initiative in 2006 with the expectation of fighting climate change in realistic and effective ways. CCI works with major large cities on a global scale to find potential solutions that will reduce carbon emissions and increase energy efficiency.[2]

 

GHG Emissions for C40 Cities
GHG Emissions for C40 Cities

The four basic programs that the CCI is currently involved in are the Climate Leadership Group (C40), Forestry Program, Islands Energy Program, and the Energy Efficiency Program. C40 was first taken up by the CCI in 2007. “Activities which this network is undertaking include collaboration with Microsoft to produce software for greenhouse gas emissions accounting at the city scale, and the Energy Efficiency Building Retrofit Program, which “brings together cities, building owners, banks, and energy-service companies to make changes to existing buildings to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”[3] It has the goal of committing sustainable activities that are intended to reduce climate change on a global scale. Every area of the world is equally represented in C40’s goals by being based in almost all of the continents.

Oddar Forest Meanchey Community
Oddar Forest Meanchey Community

The Forestry Program works with governments and communities in developing countries to decrease greenhouse gas emissions by creating sustainable resolutions for managing forests and lands.  The goal of this program is to provide developing countries with the information and resources to improve land use.  They do this by reducing carbon emissions by planting trees, improving farming practices, and building carbon measurement systems.[4]  The Islands Energy Program is partnered with governments of twenty-five island nations.  Its purpose is to develop renewable energy projects, and design and implement waste/water solutions that will cut fossil fuel usage.

 

Empire State Building
Empire State Building

 

 

The Energy Efficiency Program works to discover the obstacles to achieving a huge reduction in the amount of energy used by buildings. “In fact in the United States commercial and residential buildings accounted for over 40 percent of primary energy consumption.”[5] That is a huge amount of energy consumption.  The program works with public and private organizations, not limited to corporations, governments, and fellow non-profits.

 

According to Bulkeley and Newell, the boundaries between private and public actors in transnational climate governance are increasingly indistinct.  Transnational networks such as the CCI actually helped increase the outline of municipal responses to climate change internationally.[6]  In order to prevent climate change, the Clinton Climate Initiative operates in cooperation with companies, political groups and nonprofit organizations that aim to protect the environment.  The first step begins with local communities, proceeds to spread to countries and then makes its way to have an effect on a global scale.  You have to start small then go big.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Bulkeley, Harriet, and Peter Newell. Governing Climate Change. London: Routledge, 2010. 54, Print

[2] LearnStuff. Clinton Climate Initiative – LearnStuff. Web accessed September 2014.

[3] Ibid, 60.

[4] Clinton Foundation. Clinton Climate Initiative. Web accessed September 2014.

[5] Clinton Foundation. Clinton Climate Initiative. Web accessed September 2014.

[6] Ibid, 60.

Transnational Network: The Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance

Screen Shot    at

The Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) is a transnational network involved in climate change governance through an intersectional approach involving a diverse range of actors. Conservation International and a collection of five non-governmental organizations comprising its membership, including CARE and the Rainforest Alliance, founded the network in 2003.[i] In addition to these members the CCBA has an advising group of international research institutions (three in total, including the World Agroforestry Center) and the donors to the network (including philanthropic foundations and corporations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and British Petroleum).[ii],[iii] The goal of this alliance is to validate and verify projects that attempt to mitigate climate change through land management while positively serving the native population of that area, from the project’s conception throughout its implementation.[iv] CCBA does this through creating a set of Climate Community and Biodiversity (CCB) standards that generates reliable carbon credits. The CCBA acts as a transnational governing force rather effectively by setting a reputable and premium standard to assist in the regulation of the global carbon market.

In the international climate change discussion, ideas of equity and justice are often raised, and so is the case when discussing issues of land use. The way land is used has huge implications for global climate change; it can be a large contributing factor to emissions through activities such as deforestation or can aid in mitigation through activities such as conservation of biodiversity. Plans of mitigation through “carbon forestry” raised concerns that these projects would inevitably be unjust to native communities because of the high potential of consequences such as displacement of communities.[v] The foundation of CCBA and the CCB standards was to address these concerns in a meaningful way. The creation of CCBA dealt with this issue by not only creating a set of standards that would prohibit adverse effects of land use mitigation projects on native peoples but would also promote and require positive gains or, “co-benefits” for both the community and the environment in projects they validated.[vi]

The CCBA is able to promote and instigate these net positive projects through its CCB label. This is a process that involves a certification of “validation” that is an acknowledgment that the project has been heavily analyzed, reviewed and decidedly fulfills the CCB standards.[vii] Validation builds support for the project that then makes implementation and success of the project more likely. After a project has been validated it is then “verified,” which enforces accountability to follow through on promises for co-benefits.[viii] When carbon credits have the CCB label, it signifies they have passed validation and verification and is a high quality credit to the buyer.[ix] A study by the Ecosystem Marketplace’s State of the Forest Carbon Market showed that the investors and offset buyers were more likely to pay extra for the CCB label due to its multilateral approach and diverse range of benefits.[x] This positive reputation has gone hand in hard with increasing number of projects voluntarily seeking approval of CCB standards. In 2010 there were 19 validated projects and 21 in the process, however, over the course of the next three years there 70 projects total were validated, 19 undergoing validation, and 12 projects receiving the CCB label.[xi],[xii] The success of this process of transnational governance is illustrated by the estimated 8 million hectares of land conserved, 180,000 hectares of land restored, totaling roughly 40 million tons of CO2 emissions sequestered.[xiii] Presently, the number of CCB standards approved projects is, in the global picture, minimal. However, the fact these numbers have been increasing rapidly over the past few years eludes to a growing capacity of governing global climate change

 

Screen Shot 2014-10-01 at 12.53.15 PM

 

Overall, the Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance and the resulting standards appears to be quite effective in achieving its goal of filling a governance function to regulate land use projects that claim to be equitable to communities, have net positive mitigation benefits for the climate and increase the biodiversity and ecology of the land. It has done so by establishing its network and certifications as a reputable marker of governance through its enforcement of accountability and transparency, while engaging market based solutions to global climate change.

 

This video is an example of the types of projects CCBA deals with.

[youtube_sc url=”http://vimeo.com/31433182″ title=”Conserving%20Rainforests%20and%20Sustaining%20Indigenous%20Communities:%20The%20Story%20of%20the%20Peñablanca%20Sustainable%20Reforestation%20Project”]

 

 

Work Cited:

“About the CCBA” CCBA: The Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance. N.p., n.d.                        Web. 30 Sept. 2014. http://www.climate-standards.org/about-ccba/

 

Bulkeley, Harriet, and Peter Newell. Governing climate change. London: Routledge,             2010. Print.

 

“CCBA Fact Sheet” CCBA: The Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance. N.p., n.d.             Web. 30 Sept. 2014.                                                                                                                        https://s3.amazonaws.com/CCBA/CCB_Standards_FactSheet.pdf

 

“CCBA Standards.” CCBA: The Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance. N.p., n.d.                        Web. 30 Sept. 2014. http://www.climate-standards.org/ccb-standards/

 

Melo, Isabel, Esther Turnhout, and Bas Arts. “Integrating multiple benefits in             market-based climate mitigation schemes: The case of the Climate, Community             and Biodiversity certification scheme.” Environmental Science & Policy 35 (2014):             49-56. Web.

 

Wood, Rachel Godfrey. Carbon finance and pro-poor co-benefits: the gold standard                        and climate, community and biodiversity standards. London: Sustainable Markets             Group, International Institute for Environment and Development, 2011. Web.

 

 

[i] Bulkeley, Harriet, and Peter Newell. Governing climate change. London: Routledge,             2010. Print. Pg 65.

[ii] Bulkeley, Harriet, and Peter Newell.

[iii] “About the CCBA” CCBA: The Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance. N.p., n.d.                        Web. 30 Sept. 2014. http://www.climate-standards.org/about-ccba/

[iv] “CCBA Standards.” CCBA: The Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance. N.p., n.d.                        Web. 30 Sept. 2014. http://www.climate-standards.org/ccb-standards/

[v] Wood, Rachel Godfrey. Carbon finance and pro-poor co-benefits: the gold standard                        and climate, community and biodiversity standards. London: Sustainable Markets             Group, International Institute for Environment and Development, 2011. Web.

[vi] Wood, Rachel Godfrey.

[vii] “CCBA Standards.”

[viii] “CCBA Standards.”

[ix] “CCBA Fact Sheet” CCBA: The Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance. N.p., n.d.             Web. 30 Sept. 2014.                                                                                                                        https://s3.amazonaws.com/CCBA/CCB_Standards_FactSheet.pdf

[x] “CCBA Fact Sheet”

[xi] Wood, Rachel Godfrey.

[xii] “CCBA Fact Sheet”

[xiii] “CCBA Fact Sheet”

Cap and Trade

rggi

 

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a transnational cap and trade program for greenhouse gas emissions in states and provinces in the Northeastern United States and Eastern Canada. Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont currently participate in this program, in addition to four states and provinces acting as observers. In an attempt to lower emissions to combat climate change, these states began auctioning emission permits in September 2008. These online auctions were the largest at the time. RGGI aims to stabilize CO2 emissions from power plants at 2002-2004 levels by 2015 and then reduce the level by 2020. So far, this network has been effective in advancing its objectives with respect to governing climate change.

As symptomatic of a transnational network, RGGI was started in order to act on the issue of climate change quickly despite federal lag. In December of 2005, governors of seven states agreed to the RGGI and outlined a Memorandum of Understanding, which outlines the framework of the initiative. In response to public comment, amendments were made to the memorandum. This cap and trade program hoped to provide a model for larger implementation and reduce CO2 levels at the lowest possible cost. They aimed to create a fair and open carbon market for New England states. The RGGI explicitly states that it has no regulating or enforcement authority. As a transnational network, it uses soft measures in order to achieve its goals. It tracks and monitors CO2 allowances and it implements the auction platform, but individual states must voluntarily regulate their own emissions and pressure others to comply as well.  It engages in technical assistance, creating an environment of sharing information and building capacity within the members.

The RGGI has not been without challenges. The governor of New Jersey, Chris Christie, pulled his state out of the carbon trading system in 2011. His administration said that the RGGI does not work in cutting carbon emissions; they said it is simply an unnecessary tax to businesses. Those statements, however, are untrue. State environmentalists say that, because of the withdrawal, New Jersey is on track to lose $500 million by 2020. The New Jersey Superior Court recently ruled that because Christie’s administration refused to hold public hearing for the withdraw, it did not follow RGGI protocol. A new resolution is now coming through New Jersey’s legislature. If passed, New Jersey can return to RGGI, without needing approval from Christie. Regional governments have the power with regards to transnational networks; however, those regional governments are still responsible for acting with the needs of the public.

Transnational networks such as RGGI are often criticized on their effectiveness. Are these measures being proposed progressive actions that would not otherwise come into effect? Because of lower natural gas prices and the recession, 2012 emissions from regulated power plants equated to only 91 million tons of carbon. However, the cap for 2012 emissions was 165 million tons. Looking at these numbers, the RGGI hardly seems useful. In response to this, the RGGI created a program review to decrease the cap to 91 million tons until 2015 and maintained the 2.5 percent reduction in emissions per year from 2015 to 2020. The adaptation of policy to line up with the current emission trend is commendable. Is this enough?

Although the RGGI could have more stringent caps emissions, the transnational network is effective. Some reduction is better than no reduction. Furthermore, the New England states have the non-capped carbon states across the country to compete with. RGGI has been effective at reducing carbon emissions from the New England states.  To date, the program has prevented 792,000 short tons of CO2 emissions. The RGGI auction proceeds do a great deal in steering the region towards renewable energy sources. According to their 2012 Investment Report, RGGI’s auction proceeds to date will provide a more than $2 billion lifetime savings in energy bill savings for 3.2 million households and over 12,000 businesses in the region. The Analysis Group conducted an independent study in 2011 regarding the program and found that 16,000 job-years have resulted from RGGI’s investments.This concrete data shows the substantial impact that RGGI has had on combating climate change. It is an effective program because it is both in the best interest financially for the states and the best interest for the planet.

Transnational governance’s role in the Advancement of COICA’s Objectives

xingu

International regimes function at a nation-state level in which geography and the divide of advanced vs. non-advanced states has intermittently led to limited global governance. An alternative approach to climate change governance is transnational networks for they are based on broad range of actors across boarders that act to address climate change issues (Bulkeley and Newell 2010).  A transnational network that has been effective in advancing its objectives in governing climate change is the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon River Basin (COICA 2014).

COICA’s objective is to protect the Amazon through the indigenous people’s involvement in the development of strategies to counteract the deterioration of their biosphere (Mato 2004). COICA’s alliance between Indigenous and global organizations called for: the protection of indigenous people’s social rights and territorial rights to the Amazon, the implementation of management and conservation programs and need for international assistance in the implementation process (COICA 2014).  The COICA transnational network has been successful in climate change governance due to the utilization of transnational governance mechanisms: information-sharing, regulation and implementation and capacity building (Bulkeley and Newell 2010).

COICA’s establishment of set objectives advanced the network in climate change governance for it unified indigenous groups and global organizations that shared the common interest of protecting the Amazon.  This information-sharing mechanism caused Indigenous groups from Brazil, Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Surinam and Guyana and European Greens to create a formalized alliance in 1983 because of their shared agenda (Mato 2004).  The Indigenous communities wanted to be involved in climate change governance to voice their concerns about the Amazon. Rather than 1000 indigenous groups expressing their concerns about climate change, COICA was implemented to create a collective identity of indigenous concerns.  COICA’s effective voice advanced these objectives and it gave their concerns a unified voice that could easily be heard and shared (Mato 2004). This information-sharing mechanism resulted COICA’s ideas to spread and to gain affinity around the globe.

COICA’s regulation governance mechanism resulted in the continuous participation and the increase in membership in the network.  There is no juristic level in transnational networks, meaning that none of the agreements are binding (Bulkeley and Newell 2010).  However, COICA’s standards and benefits from the group dynamitic were able to maintain members from around the globe to participate in COICA.  According to theredddesk.org, the regulation governance of COICA is effective for it is able to keep thousands of indigenous communities existing in 9 countries involved in the alliance. This broad scope of people’s needs are consistent with COICA’s standards, consisting of: social movements, human rights institutions and climate negotiations.  The successful regulation mechanism has led to members of COICA to consist of voluntary public and private actors.

From the involvement of private and public actors, the implementation+ capacity-building mechanism allowed for diverse expertise in advancing COICA’s objectives.  The Indigenous people’s role was to generate the public’s interest and attention about the deterioration of the Amazon through information-sharing mechanism (Mato 2004). Whereas, the public actors were to be aware of the indigenous people’s rights in decision-making and speak on their behalf (Mato 2004).  For example, COICA and AIDSEP got the Peruvian government to agree to “facilitate indigenous people’s participation in COP20”.  According to International Work Group of Indigenous Affairs, an indigenous preparatory conference between the COICA and the Peruvian government will take place November 28th– 30th. Due to utilization of different governance resources COICA was able to generate change in the governance negotiations.  Although REDD+ is not actually supported by COICA, the fact that an agreement exists indicates that the idea of preserving the amazon had infiltrated climate change negotiations.  Instead of REDD+, COICA has created the Indigenous REDD+ Alternative, which is directed towards the preservation of indigenous territories and the incorporation of forest services. The implementation and capacity-building mechanism has led to large advancements in the front against the amazon’s deterioration.

Compared to International Regimes, transnational networks play and have played a distinctive role in governing climate change. COICA’s involvement with indigenous groups and global agents promoted the advancement of its objectives towards protecting the amazon and its indigenous inhabitants.  The role in which information-sharing, regulation and implementation and building-capacity mechanisms have contributed to the success of COICA in climate governance is clearly evident.

Sources

“Coordination of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin (COICA).” The REDD Desk. Global Canopy, 24 Mar. 2014. Web. 1 Oct. 2014.

Mato, Daniel. “Transnational networks of global and local production of representations of ideas of civil society actors.” Policy citizenship and civil society in times of globalization (2004): 67-93.

“UNFCCC: The Road towards COP 20 in Lima.” International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). IWGIA, 26 June 2014. Web. 1 Oct. 2014.

Bulkeley, Harriet, and Peter Newell. Governing Climate Change. London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

The Climate Alliance: Linking European Municipalities to Indigenous Amazonians

The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, was an international agreement by sovereign nation states to commit to legally binding emissions reduction targets. While this was a big step forward for climate change governance, it did not bind all countries in the world to reduce their global emissions, only certain developed countries, because it was argued that developing countries were not responsible for the current problem and did not have the infrastructure to implement mitigation efforts. But in recent years, the GHG emissions of developing countries have surpassed those of developed countries. For example, in 2008 China was the top emitter of any country in the world, with India in third. And the US, the most powerful country and the 2nd largest GHG emitter in the world, did not join the Kyoto Protocol and is not bound by it (Global Emissions). Furthermore, nation-states are often limited as to how directly they are able to influence carbon emissions in their country. Much of the time, it is non-state actors, such as multinational corporations or individual consumers, that most directly influence the amount of carbon emissions (Bulkeley and Newell 8).

As people began to realize some of the failures and limitations of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC, they began to form non-state organizations and networks working across borders to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Municipalities, provinces and corporations formed various transnational governance organizations and networks to try and influence international governance and promote change at the community level (Bulkeley and Newell 54). One of these transnational networks is the Climate Alliance and was actually formed before the Kyoto Protocol went into effect (Bulkeley and Newell 55). The Climate Alliance has been very effective in advancing its objectives and reaching its goals. It has contributed to the exchange of information about local climate policy, coordinated projects devoted to indigenous rights, and has prompted CO2 emissions reductions in numerous European municipalities (Welcome).

The Climate Alliance, officially called The Climate Alliance of European Cities with Indigenous Rainforest Peoples, was created in 1990 and consists of 1,700 cities, municipalities and districts. It is partnered with the Coordinating Body for the Indigenous Peoples Organization of the Amazon Basin (COICA). COICA represents the interests of indigenous peoples in the functions of the climate alliance (Climate Profile).

The Climate Alliance was formed for the main purpose of supporting indigenous peoples and their rights in the Amazon Basin. The organization goes about this is in a variety of ways, one of which is by calling for ratification of ILO Convention No. 169, an international norm put forth by the International Labor Organization guaranteeing the legally binding protection of the basic rights of indigenous peoples. The alliance also participates in the ad-hoc working group formed at the 4th Conference of the Parties to the Convention of Biological Diversity, which addresses issues surrounding the preservation of “traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous peoples”, and “respect[ing], preserv[ing] and maintain[ing] the sustainable use of biological diversity (What is the ILO?, Convention). European members of The Climate Alliance also bind themselves to certain greenhouse gas emissions reductions, support dialogues among indigenous peoples and governments and corporations, and abstain from the municipal procurement of tropical timber derived from destructive logging, and support other policies and measures for the protection of tropical rainforests and biodiversity (Our Objectives). Also, if the association for whatever reason dissolves, the funds, instead of going to states, serve non-profit purposes and goes to support projects in rainforests (Article 2). In the more political sphere, the Climate Alliance represents member European municipalities in events organized by the European Commission, and also influences decisions made by the EU institutions to strengthen the role of local authorities in climate change policy (European Policy).

In action, The Climate Alliance has been very effective in implementing many of its ideals. It has supported a project for the assembly of mobile solar lamps and modules, which will replace petroleum lamps in the Peruvian rainforest. This will not only help to cut down on CO2 emissions and health problems resulting from the petroleum lamps, but also improve the living conditions of indigenous communities and support renewable sources of energy (Solar Partnerships). Other things the climate alliance has done include representing both European municipalities and indigenous organizations in international forums, such as the UNFCCC, and working to secure indigenous rights surrounding such areas as reforestation measures and providing legal aid for indigenous organizations under attack from logging companies and oil corporations (International Policy, Cooperations and Projects). The most obvious instances of this happening are in Sarayaku, Ecuador, when The Climate Alliance provided legal aid and advice to the community after the government attempted to partition the community’s land between various oil companies. Protests and resistance from the community halted drilling, and there are currently ongoing debates over land and mining rights, although in 1998 the constitutional court recognized that “oil exploitation violated the rights of indigenous peoples” (Sarayaku). In the realm of reforestation, The Climate Alliance has raised awareness in indigenous groups, including COICA, about the dangers of these reforestation efforts, and subsequently disseminated information and held seminars for indigenous peoples to prepare for upcoming climate talks about the issue (Indigene Peoples).

The Climate Alliance also provides an information exchange about tools and recommendations for local climate policy through conferences and publications, and also showcases its members’ achievements in various databases (climate alliance activities). In the realm of CO2 emissions in European municipalities, a lot of good progress has been made. Liepzig, Germany has reduced its tons of C02 emission per resident from 11,315 tons in 1990 to 6,150 tons in 2005, a reduction of almost half. Langenegg, Austria is currently meeting the heating demand of municipal buildings 98.5% through renewable resources (Germany). Other municipalities have made great progress also, and all municipalities in the Climate Alliance have pledged to cut their per capita emissions by half by 2030 (Our Objectives).

In the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol, many transnational organizations and networks, including The Climate Alliance, sprang up in reaction to perceived failure within the Protocol and the UNFCCC. The Climate Alliance, an organization dedicated to the protection of the world’s climate and indigenous rights in the Amazon Basin, has been effective in advancing its objectives and picking up the slack from international climate governance between nation states. It has protected indigenous communities from destruction by oil corporations and loggers and reduced GHG emissions in both Europe and the Amazon, all while promoting information exchange between municipalities about local climate policy. This shows that transnational networks and organization can be very useful in supporting and informing policy at the local level, which is important because this is one of the most important levels for behavior and policy change to happen. If effective climate policies are wanted, community involvement is necessary, because they are able to work on a more manageable scale and are able to understand local circumstances and obstacles to policy change better than a representative working at the national or international level (Bulkeley and Newell 73).

 

 

Works Cited

Bulkeley, Harriet, and Peter Newell. Governing Climate Change. London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

The Climate Alliance. “Article 2: The Purpose of the Association.” Statutes. Proc. of Assemble of 30th March, 1992. Frankfurt Am Main: European Secretariat. Statutes. The Climate Alliance. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

“Climate Alliance: European Policy.” The Climate Alliance. The Climate Alliance, 30 Sept. 2014. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

“Climate Alliance: Our Profile.” The Climate Alliance. The Climate Alliance, 30 Sept. 2014. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

“Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).” Indigene: Biodiversity. The Climate Alliance, 9 Aug. 2014. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

“Cooperations and Projects.” Indigene: Cooperations and Projects. The Climate Alliance, 9 Aug. 2014. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

Germany. German Ministry. German Agency for the Environment. Future Café: Milestones in Local Climate Protection. The Climate Alliance. The Climate Alliance. Web. 30 Oct. 2014.

“Global Emissions.” EPA. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 29 Sept. 2014.

“Indigenous Peoples in the International Climate Process.” The Climate Alliance. The Climate Alliance, 9 Aug. 2014. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

“International Policy.” Climate Alliance:. The Climate Alliance, 30 Sept. 2014. Web. 30 Oct. 2014.

“Our Objectives.” Climate Alliance: Our Objectives. The Climate Alliance, 30 Sept. 2014. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

“The Sarayaku Community Needs Juridical Support.” The Climate Alliance. The Climate Alliance, 9 Aug. 2014. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

“Solar Partnerships – Solar Lamps in the Peruvian Rainforest.” Indigene: Solar Lamps. The Climate Alliance, 9 Aug. 2014. Web. 01 Oct. 2014.

“Welcome to the Website of Climate Alliance!” Climate Alliance: Home. The Climate Alliance, 30 Sept. 2014. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

“What Is the ILO?” Indigene: ILO 169. The Climate Alliance, 9 Aug. 2014. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.